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Scientism is one of the more elusive participants in contemporary intellectual 
life. It is hard to pin down exactly and its card-carrying defenders are few and 
far between. Perhaps it’s an overstatement to suggest that it is ‘the new 
orthodoxy’, but it certainly is an influential presence. It rears its head in popular 
science writing, in dismissive comments about the humanities, culture, or 
religion, and in far-reaching optimism about the potential of science to address 
humanity’s greatest challenges (for examples, see De Ridder 2014). 
 The editors of the present collection, then, are to be commended for 
engaging scientism critically. They show how philosophy is highly relevant to 
contemporary culture. If you believe, as I do, that the influence of scientism is 
pernicious, then it is important to get clearer on what it is, where and how it 
exerts its influence inside and outside the academy, and what its problems are. 
The volume contains contributions on all these issues, and more. As far as I 
know, it is the first of its kind, although I’m aware of two more currently in 
preparation: Boudry and Pigliucci (forthcoming) and De Ridder, Peels, and Van 
Woudenberg (forthcoming). 
 The volume consists of eight essays, preceded by an introduction by 
Richard N. Williams. Daniel N. Robinson criticizes scientism for ignoring the 
inevitable role of human intentionality and interpretation in science and 
scientific explanation. Lawrence M. Principe delves into the history of one of 
scientism’s cherished myths—that of a deep and long-standing conflict between 
science and religion—and shows that this conflict is mostly a late-nineteenth-
century invention that served ideological purposes. Bas C. van Fraassen 
compares the naturalistic with the empiricist stance and ends up recommending 
the latter. Peter M. S. Hacker looks at neuroscience as an area where scientism 
is rampant, arguing that parts of the field are riddled with conceptual 
confusions and misguided experimental work. Richard Swinburne mounts an 
intriguing argument against physical determinism from epistemic principles 
that must be presupposed in scientific practice. Roger Scruton holds a 
passionate plea for the kind of understanding the humanities, properly 
conceived, can provide and insists that such understanding is beyond the reach 
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of scientific methods. Kenneth F. Schaffner provides an overview of recent work 
in the field of neuroethics. Finally, James K. A. Smith draws attention to 
accounts of science in which science is portrayed as a cultural institution that 
depends significantly on interpretation, social construction, and implicit 
practical know-how, thus throwing cold water on the idea that science is 
exclusively in the business of unearthing bare objective truths. 
 I will focus my remarks on four essays that address scientism and its 
problems most directly. In his introduction, Williams urges that we shouldn’t 
confuse science with scientism. Scientism adds (controversial) epistemological 
and ontological claims to science. All forms of scientism, says Williams, are 
committed to at least the following four things: (1) only scientific knowledge is 
real knowledge, (2) hence the methods of the natural sciences are universally 
applicable, (3) we can trust science to solve humanity’s problems, and (4) 
naturalism or materialism is true. While (1) and (2) indeed strike me as core 
tenets of scientism, I don’t see why adherents of scientism need to be very 
optimistic about science’s problem-solving potential. From (1) and (2), it follows 
only that we ought to look to science to solve problems, but nothing guarantees 
that solutions will be forthcoming. As to (4), I think it would have been useful to 
distinguish between epistemological and ontological forms of scientism. The 
former would make only a claim about science as an exclusive source of 
knowledge and let the chips fall where they may on the metaphysics, while the 
latter would hold that only those things exist that science acknowledges. I found 
Williams’s further suggestions that scientism is wedded to various speculative 
Enlightenment ideas far less compelling and sometimes even confusing. For 
instance, the claim that ‘scientism entails acceptance of a particular, quite literal 
reading of … “Cartesian dualism”’ (11) seems downright false. Just like 
physicalists and naturalists, adherents of scientism reject any form of mind–
body dualism. 
 Both Robinson and Scruton make a forceful case for the inevitability of 
intentional explanation, interpretation, and judgement in understanding 
individual and collective human behaviour. Robinson’s argument hinges on 
explanation. There are hosts of meaningful explanatory questions about 
individual and collective human behaviour. The best answers to these questions 
refer to human strivings, meaning, reasons, and other aspects of human mental 
life, and not law-like generalizations or information about brain states, 
molecules or atoms. Scruton mounts a defence of the traditional role of the 
humanities as dealing with matters of culture, meaning, normativity, and 
learned judgement. It is of the essence of human beings that they have a 
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conscious, subjective, first-person perspective on themselves and the world 
around them. From this perspective, the world of the ‘spirit’ arises. The crucial 
problem for scientism is that, while the first-person perspective is in principle 
inaccessible to the third-person methods of science, it cannot be ignored if we 
are to make sense of who we are. Thus scientism becomes a procrustean bed 
when it seeks to tackle questions in the domain of the humanities: ‘The science 
precedes the question, and is used to redefine it as a question that the science 
can solve’ (137). Neuroscientific approaches to art and memetics are telling 
examples of misguided scientistic approaches. Robinson’s and Scruton’s 
arguments should certainly appeal to the unprejudiced and fair-minded reader. 
They might not speak to the scientistically inclined, because they seem to 
foreclose any possibilities for constructive interaction between the sciences and 
humanities. Although it is difficult to say in advance what such interactions 
would look like, it seems to me that there are good examples in, e.g., moral 
psychology and the philosophy of emotions. 
 Hacker helpfully summarizes some insights from his earlier joint work 
with Max Bennett on the history and philosophy of neuroscience. 
Neuroscientists—and neuroscientistically minded philosophers—are prone to 
saying things like ‘The brain decides’ or ‘Memory is stored at synaptic 
connections’. This is confused: people make decisions, not any of their parts. 
Memory is knowledge retained, and to know something is to have a complex set 
of abilities that cannot meaningfully be said to be stored at synapses. Such 
conceptual confusions are rampant in neuroscience and its popularizing 
depictions. Naturally, they give rise to numerous mistaken claims and 
misguided experiments. I couldn’t agree more with Hacker that neuroscience 
needs to pay far more attention to conceptual clarity. But I also found myself 
with a lingering suspicion. Suppose all of this were taken care of. Would all 
apparent threats from neuroscience to our freedom, selfhood, and rationality 
ipso facto have dissolved? I fear not. So there will be argumentative work left 
even when we’ve taken Hacker’s lessons to heart. 
 I have three more critical observations about the volume as a whole. First, 
since scientism is so hard to pin down, more could have been done to get clearer 
on what forms it takes, so as to scrutinize it at a finer-grained level of analysis. 
Second, I wish the editors had been more successful in making all of their 
contributors interact with scientism directly. In spite of their other merits, the 
chapters by Van Fraassen, Swinburne, and Schaffner do not even mention it. 
Some of the material in them may well be relevant to an assessment of 
scientism, but readers are left to work out the connections themselves. Third, an 
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unfortunate oversight on the part of the editors (and contributors) is the 
absence of references to extant literature on scientism. Scientism may be 
somewhat elusive, but it’s not as if no philosophers have written on it. In 
particular, we find sustained discussions of scientism—sometimes even 
reflected in book or chapter titles—in the works of Mary Midgley, Tom Sorrell, 
Susan Haack, Mikael Stenmark, John Dupré, and, more recently, Alexander 
Rosenberg and Don Ross, James Ladyman, and David Spurrett. Yet none of 
them is discussed in the present volume. 
 I don’t want to end on a critical note, however. Scientism: The New 
Orthodoxy is a rich and rewarding collection of essays from a wide range of 
perspectives. I can easily envision parts of it being taught—perhaps alongside 
more fundamental work in philosophy of science and epistemology—in upper-
level undergraduate or graduate seminars that want to engage contemporary 
intellectual life and the relations between science and philosophy. I hope it finds 
a wide readership among philosophers and other humanities scholars, as well as 
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